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Al|an C. Hutchinson*

Out of the Black Hole: Toward a
Fresh Approach to Tort Causation

The present state of Canadian doctrine on causation in tort law is in serious
disarray Judges and jurists persist in thinking that it is a factual inquiry separate
from policy concerns. This is made obvious in the recent Supreme Court decision
in Clements and in the academic commentary around it. In contrast, I insist that
the requirement of causation must be understood as being entirely part of the
broader debate on the goals and policies of tort law generally Causation is a
topic drenched with normative values and should be treated as such.
La doctrine canadienne sur le lien de causalit6 en droit de la responsabilit6
civile est en plein ddsarroi. Les juges et les juristes persistent a croire qu'il
s'agit d'une enqu~te factuelle, distincte des preoccupations politiques. Ce point
ressort fortement dans le recent arrdt Clements de la Cour suprdme et dans les
commentaires doctrinaux sur cet arr~t. A I'oppos6, 'auteurinsiste : Iexigence
de I'existence du lien de causalit6 doit 6tre considdrde comme faisant partie
intdgrante du plus vaste ddbat sur les objectifs et les politiques du droit de la
responsabilit6 civile en general. Le lien de causalit6 est un sujet imprdgnd de
valeurs normatives et doit 6tre trait6 comme tel.
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I had a feeling once about Mathematics, that I saw it all-Depth beyond
depth was revealed to me-the Byss and the Abyss. I saw, as one might
see the transit of Venus-or even the Lord Mayor's Show, a quantity
passing through infinity and changing its sign from plus to minus. I saw
exactly how it happened and why the tergiversation was inevitable: and
how one step involved all the others. It was like politics. But it was after
dinner and I let it go!
Winston Churchill'
Introduction
One could be forgiven for experiencing that same sense of resigned
bafflement that Churchill had on confronting the equally daunting subject
of causation. There are few topics in law that have generated as much
literature and as much confusion as causation. Law is little different from
other disciplines, like science and philosophy. Although the context and
purpose may be different, the struggle is equally torturous and troubled.
Indeed, the extent of elucidation and clarity achieved seems to be inversely
related to the intensity and extent of analysis offered. For all the effort
invested, little progress has been made in either the legal academy or the
judicial ranks. Causation remains a veritable black hole that, once entered,
can rarely be escaped. It has claimed the scholarly lives of almost all those
who presume to have decoded or resolved its pervasive puzzles. In this
regard, Churchill escaped relatively unscathed.
So why am I entering the field and running the risk of a similar fate?
My approach is to reject the present paradigm within which existing
theories and accounts operate both at the judicial and academic level.
Rather than seek to outline some neutral or pseudo-scientific test for

1.
Winston S Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission (London: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1930), 35.
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understanding or navigating the black hole of so-called factual causation,
I recommend abandoning that irresolvable and hopeless quest. By this, I
mean that the mysteries of causation do not lend themselves to resolution
in any analytical or pure manner. Different answers will recommend
themselves depending on the context and purpose of any inquiry: what
will pass argumentative muster in one situation (e.g., science) will not be
appropriate for another (e.g., law). In short, I take the view that, if you ask
the wrong questions about causation in torts (as most judges and scholars
do) you are guaranteed to get the wrong answers. In line with this, I will
develop a different approach for meeting the challenge of fixing causation
in tort law. Mindful that "knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of
values,"2 I insist that the requirement of causation must be understood as
being entirely part of the broader debate on the goals and policies of tort
law generally. Causation is a topic drenched with normative values and
should be treated as such.
Most of the scholarly action concerns those situations in which there
are multiple tortfeasors and the like. However, the efficacy of the "but for"
test is dubious and contested for even the most basic one-on-one instances
of tort liability. The most recent cases of Clements v. Clements3 in Canada
and Williams v. Bermuda Hospitals Board' in the United Kingdom offer
testament to that; both involve a possible tortious cause and a non-tortious
one. Accordingly, after introducing the present state of Canadian doctrine
on causation, I examine the best, if flawed, scholarly efforts at solving
the mysteries of causation; it is not my intention to offer an exhausting
or exhaustive account of the existing scholarly literature. Then, after
digging deeper into Clements and its theoretical underpinnings, I look at
how causation can be dealt with as a policy matter. The final third of the
essay lays out a different way of looking at tort law and how a causation
rule inspired by McGhee v. National Coal Board' might be designed that
respects that approach. Throughout the essay, the ambition is to get beyond
the prevailing tendency to treat causation as being an exclusively factual
issue and to grasp it as a thoroughly policy-based inquiry.

2.
Hilary Putnam, The Collapse OfThe Fact/Value DichotomyAnd OtherEssays (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2002), 145. This broad pragmatic claim is developed and defended in later
parts of the paper. See infra, text at notes 40-43.
3.
2012 SCC 32, [2012] 2 SCR 181 [Clements]. There was a dissent by LeBel and Rothstein JJ,
but it was simply about the majority's decision to order a retrial rather than a verdict being entered in
favour of the defendant.
4.
[2016] UKPC 4 [Williams]. The case was on appeal from the Court of Appeal for Bermuda.
5.
[1972] 3 All ER 1008 (HL) [McGhee].

564

The Dalhousie Law Journal

I. Causefor complaint
A convenient place to begin is with the most recent pronouncement
on causation in tort by the Supreme Court of Canada in Clements. The
defendant crashed when a nail on the road punctured his motorcycle's
tire and he was unable to retain control of his bike. At the time of the
accident, he was travelling well over the speed limit and his motorcycle
was considerably overloaded. His wife was a passenger and was seriously
injured. She sued her husband. She won at trial, but lost on appeal as
it was found that the accident might well have happened even if the
defendant had not been negligent. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed
the wife's appeal and ordered a new trial. The central question for the
Court was whether the defendant/driver's negligence was the cause of
the accident-would the accident have occurred anyway regardless of the
defendant's negligence? In answering that question, McLachlin C. took
the opportunity on behalf of the Court to re-state the preferred approach to
causation in personal injury litigation that the Court had been seeking to
follow, with some deviations and detours, for the past two decades or more
since Snell-the traditional and unadorned "but for" test.6
After a detour of several decades, the Supreme Court of Canada
managed to end up in much the same place that it began. The basic
assertion of contemporary Canadian jurisprudence on causation seems to
be the same as what Caesar Wright insisted upon almost seventy years
ago in 1948-"cause and effect are pure questions of fact."' By this,
both Dean Wright and McLachlin C.1. (the most frequent contemporary
Supreme Court judge to opine on tort doctrine) are claiming that, even
if its resolution is elusive and uncertain, the effort to fix a causal relation
between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's harm is entirely factual in
spirit and performance. Involving no normative or evaluative factors, they
defend the stance that it is possible to fix a causal nexus without any resort
to controversial matters of value or policy. As such, the causal inquiry can
be separated entirely from matters of social justice or moral responsibility.
Indeed, for Wright and McLachlin C., to do otherwise would be to
collapse their own philosophical division between fact and value. This

6.
[1990] 2 SCR 311 [1990] SCJ No 73. For an excellent and insightful account ofthe pre-Clements
jurisprudence, see Vaughan Black, "The Rise and Fall of Plaintiff-Friendly Causation," (2016) 53:4
Alta L Rev. My view is that the existing doctrine is now plaintiff-hostile.
7.
Cecil Wright, "The Law of Torts, 1923-1947" (1948) 26 Can Bar Rev 46 at 58. The Supreme
Court of Canada is not alone in this basic operating assumption. See the approach of the High Court of
Australia in Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1993), 176 CLR 408 at 412 (Mason CJ, Deane
and Toohey JJ) and Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal, [2008] HCA 19, 245 ALR 653 at 674 (Kirby
J).
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would risk severe and possibly fatal harm to their jurisprudential and
judicial projects to ground an appropriate scheme of tort liability.
In Clements, the Supreme Court emphasized that the causation inquiry
was an entirely factual one and to be based on a "robust common sense
approach"; scientific precision was not required.' No liability could be
placed on a negligent defendant unless there was a showing of "but for"
causation-the injured plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that the
accident would not have occurred but for the defendant's negligence. It
is only in exceptional circumstances that there can be an abandonment
of the "but for" requirement in favour of a "material contribution to risk"
approach. Such circumstances will generally only exist where there are
multiple tortfeasors and when the "but for" test cannot work for them
separately, but only as a group (i.e., but for the negligence of one of
the group, the plaintiff would not have been injured). Accordingly, the
question for a trial judge is whether it can be determined on a balance of
probabilities that the plaintiff's injuries would not have happened "but
for" the negligence of the defendant.
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court insisted that this approach
was underwritten and justified by "fairness and conforms to the principles
that ground recovery in tort." 9 These considerations were offered as a basis
for both a continued reliance on the "but for" rule and the limited scope
of any exceptions to it. As such, it needs to be demonstrated that "the
defendant's negligence was necessary to bring about the injury.""o As for
a "material contribution" test (i.e., did the defendant's negligence make
a material contribution to the risk that the plaintiff would be harmed) the
Court approved of the critical view that this "does not signify a test of
causation at all; rather it is a policy-driven rule of law designed to permit
plaintiffs to recover in such cases despite their failure to prove causation.""
Consequently, it decided that this exceptional way of proceeding is only
defensible in cases of multiple tortfeasors, not single tortfeasors.1 2

8.

Clements, supra note 3 at para 9.

9.
Ibid at para 16.
10. Ibid at para 8 (emphasis in original).
11. Ibid at para 14, citing Smith JAinMacDonaldv Goertz, 2009 BCCA 358, 96 BCLR (4th) 236 at
para 17.
12. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom did decide that a material contribution to risk
approach did apply to a single negligent employer who had exposed a plaintiff to asbestos. See
Sienkiewicz v Greif(UK) Ltd, [2011] UKSC 10 [2011] WL 674961. The Supreme Court of Canada
seems to have shifted in its understanding of what counts as "material contribution." In earlier cases,
like Snell, supra note 4, it seemed to talk more about "material contribution to injury," not "material
contribution to risk."
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Despite the Court's protestations to the contrary, this is "a radical
approach" that stands in sharp contrast to much existing legal doctrine
and juristic commentary.1 3 The incorporation of a necessity requirement
is a regressive step in terms of the plaintiff's burden in establishing
liability: the idea that causation is and can be understood as an entirely
policy-free inquiry is unfounded and misleading. Moreover, the radical
and regressive nature of the decision is further compounded by the almost
off-hand, yet startling statement that it is "the theory of corrective justice
that underlies the law of negligence."" Both these claims by the Court
are open to strong and severe disapproval. While McLachlin C. is right
to connect tort doctrine to deeper theoretical principles, she is wrong,
in terms of both descriptive accuracy and prescriptive policy, about tort
law's commitment to corrective justice generally and the role of necessity
in causation doctrine. Finally, the Court's reliance on a "robust common
sense approach" adds intellectual insult to analytical injury; it is more an
admission of explanatory failure than a genuine attempt at elucidation.
Common sense is usually neither common nor sensible; it is a screen for
much deeper and unrevealed preferences and practical commitments.
Accordingly, as I will show, the judgment and decision in Clements is
wanting in so many ways. Although it is offered by the Supreme Court of
Canada as the definitive and state-of-the-art word on causation in tort law,
it falls well short of its lofty aim; it never really gets off the ground as a
convincing account of causation. Indeed, there can be few recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada that have succeeded in promising so much
and delivering so little. It simply defies understanding that McLachlin C.1.
and the Court could think that perplexities of causation can be handled,
let alone be resolved, by the discredited and simplistic "but for" test. The
Court itself has actually been a stem critic of the limitations of the "but
for" rule in the past." As such, the challenge for the critical theorist is to
ignore what the Court claims that it is doing and bring to light those values
and policies that actually animate the Court's reasoning and applications.

13. Supra note 3 at para 16. There is some support for McLachlin CJ's approach in the American
Restatement. There, it is contended that the ascertainment of cause-in-fact is based upon factual
necessity, not on legal policy. Moreover, although it is conceded that the "but for" test needs to be
relaxed in multiple cause situations, the Restatement rejects a "material contribution" or "substantial
factor" solution. Restatement (Third) Torts: Liabilityfor Physical and EmotionalHarm, (St Paul, MN:
ALI, 2009, 2012). See also Boim v Holy Land Foundationfor Reliefand Development, 549 F (3d) 685

(7th Cir 2008).
14. Ibidatpara2l.
15. See, for example, Snell, supra note 6 andAthey v Leonati, [1996] 3 SCR 458.
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II. Into the mystical
Efforts to come to grips with mysteries of causation in philosophy and
science are legend. Indeed, the history of Western theorizing is cluttered
with efforts to crack the metaphysical code of causation. However, many
have resigned themselves to a Humean scepticsim that considers the
analytical search for general laws of causality as a pointless endeavour;
causality is about convention and experience, not logic or metaphysics.16
Nevertheless, this does not mean that judges and jurists have given up
on the task of developing a workable and fact-based rule of causation
that can move forward the issue of whether a defendant should or should
not compensate a plaintiff for harms that have been allegedly caused by
the defendant. However, the move from "a" cause to "the" cause of the
accident demands an evaluative filter or standard that calls upon a range
of policy values and goes beyond the supposed factual parameters of the
traditional inquiry. Many tort theorists concede this and re-align their
inquiry towards more focused and practical concerns.
To ask what the cause of Mrs. Clements's injuries was is to go down a
blind alley that leads everywhere and nowhere. There are so many potential
causes of Mrs. Clements's injuries that can claim some credence-her
presence on the bike, his ownership of a motorbike, her marriage to Mr.
Clements, the quality of the road surface, the weather conditions, and the
list goes on. Of course, it is tempting to recommend that it is possible to
isolate "the cause" of the accident out of the plethora of possible causes.
Rather than devote their efforts to answering the open-ended inquiry into
what caused the plaintiff's harm, judges and commentators have turned
their attention to answering the less open-ended, but still general inquiry
into "did the defendant cause the plaintiff's harm?" While this is a more
modest project, it is no less difficultto answer with any certainty. Moreover,
it immediately places the search for factual inquiry within an evaluative
framework-the goals and values of tort liability. Thus, the factual test for
causation is embedded in a value-laden context.
The tort theorist who has made the most progress in addressing
the perplexities of this legal inquiry of "did the defendant cause the
plaintiff's harm?" is Jane Stapleton. She is by far the most sophisticated
and impressive of the legal scholars who reflect upon causation in torts.
Her work is always insightful, pragmatic and rewarding. Yet, for all her
critical and compelling rejection of most causation theories on offer, she
holds firm to the informing and dominant paradigm. She insists that it
16.

David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Chicago: The Open Court

Publishing Co, 1921), Parl 7.
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is important to be clear about the purpose for which a causal inquiry is
made; the contexts of science and law are very different and have different
objectives. However, that said, she proceeds to argue that questions of
legal causation can be resolved in their own terms without reference to
the broader policy goals of tort liability. She maintains that the challenge
of finding a test for causation that is factual in nature and application is
achievable.
Mindful that the law has been interested in and willing to impose
liability on non-necessary actions, Stapleton acknowledges that this
entails extending what can count as causal. This demands a reappraisal
of the reach and rationale of the traditional "but for." As such, she offers
an extended and modified "but for" test that allows for contribution and
involvement by way of a counter-factual/hypothetical approach:
By comparing the actual world of the particular phenomenon with a
hypothetical world (which we construct by notionally omitting the
specified factor and sometimes other factors) we can determine, in the
context of that comparison, the "involvement", if any, of the specified
factor in the existence of the actual phenomenon. It is by using data
such as our understanding of the physical laws of nature and evidence of
behaviour that we detennine whether our specified factor was involved
in the existence of the actual phenomenon. That data also allow us to
distinguish, on an objective basis, whether this involvement is in the
form of necessity, duplicate necessity or contribution. 7
While she manages to push the debate forward by separating the legal
focus from the more general theoretical or metaphysical challenge of
causal relations, Stapleton is unable to bring it to a convincing conclusion.
Her contribution does much work, but it does not and cannot get her all
the way. Indeed, her account founders on the kind of basic problem thrown
up by Clements. Her extended "but for" test goes beyond the traditional
rule by stipulating that a defendant's negligence is a cause of the plaintiff's
harm if "but for it alone, (1) the injury would not exist or (2) an actual
contribution to an element of the positive requirements for its occurrence
would not exist."" In the Clements context, the two main problems with
this are significant and debilitating.
First, Stapleton's "alone" requirement smacks of exactly the kind of
necessity that McLachlin C. references and that Stapleton claims to have

17. Jane Stapleton, "Choosing What We Mean by 'Causation' in the Law" (2008) 73:2 Mo L Rev
433 at 444. See also "Factual Causation" (2010) 38:3 Fed L Rev 467 [Stapleton, "Factual Causation"]
and "An 'Extended But-For' Test for the Causal Relation in the Law of Obligations" (2015) 35:4
Oxford J Leg Stud 697 [Stapleton, "An Extended But-For"].
18. Stapleton, "An Extended But-For," ibid at 714.
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gone beyond; it implies a certain scientific stringency that she claims to have
modified or abandoned. Secondly, the central challenge on the Clements
facts is to determine whether there was any contribution or involvement
by Mr. Clements in his wife's injuries-did the fact that Mr. Clements was
driving his overladen bike too fast contribute to or sufficiently involve him
in the occurrence of the accident? Was it more or less material than the tirebursting nail? It is not that the "but for" test, extended or otherwise, rules
out a finding of causation, but that it is indecisive; it begs the very question
that it was designed to answer. Moreover and most importantly, there is
no legitimate resource that Stapleton can call upon that will resolve that
uncertainty and that remains true to the self-imposed parameters of her
inquiry. Shut off from the policies or values that inform tort law, she has
backed herself into an analytical corner.
Stapleton is to be applauded for unmasking "the seductive simplicity"
of the traditional "but for" inquiry and for taking us beyond McLachlin
C.J. and other traditional "but for" enthusiasts.1 9 And that is no small thing.
But, lacking the jurisprudential courage of her critical convictions, she
remains committed to the possibility of a fact-based account of causation
and, therefore, to the "but for" test, albeit in an extended form. She takes
the important step of justifying her extended "but for" test by reference
to the law's policies and interests in imposing tort liability on actions that
are non-necessary, but she seeks to curtain off those same policies when
she formulates and applies her neo-traditional approach to causation.
Consequently, the challenge for those who take seriously the idea that the
facts of legal causation are beholden to and permeated with the policies
and values of tort law is to offer up a reinvigorated causation inquiry that
respects and incorporates those same policies and values.
III. A false corrective
Ironically, although McLachlin C.J. insists that the causation inquiry in
tort law is exclusively a matter of necessity and fact, she justifies that
conclusion in terms of "fairness and... the principles that ground recovery
in tort."2 0 More precisely, she contends that the traditional "but for" test
is a corollary of "the theory of corrective justice that underlies the law
of negligence." 2 1 Her major and only source for what that theory entails
is the celebrated work of Ernest Weinrib, the doyen of corrective justice
advocates. However, Weinrib himself is no defender of the traditional
rendition of the "but for" test as the most fitting component of a corrective
19.

Stapleton, "Factual Causation," supra note 17 at 476.

20.

Clements, supra note 3 at para 16.

21.

Ibidatpara2l.
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justice account of tort law. While he does insist that "what must be shown
with respect to each bilateral pairing is that the unreasonable risk created
by a particular defendant matured into injury to a particular plaintiff,"22
he does not demand that this entails a traditional "but for" test. Instead,
he offers a more capacious and value-based account of what counts as a
sufficient causal connection.
Although the requirement of a factual causal nexus between the
defendant's act and the plaintiff's harm is central to his formalist scheme
of tort law, Weinrib is not forthright or expansive in demonstrating
how that nexus will be established with sufficient exactness in practical
circumstances. However, he does tip his hand when he responds to
suggestions that the difficulties of proving causation by traditional
methods (i.e., the "but for" test) have led to innovations that involve the
shifting of burdens of proof from plaintiffs to defendants. He comments
that such proposals "merely modify the evidentiary mechanisms regarding
causation without negating its systemic importance for tort liability."23
Consequently, Weinrib is far from wedded to a traditional "but for" test as
the basis of a scheme of tort law built upon notions of corrective justice.
Indeed, in a recent article, Weinrib has developed much further and
more directly the kind of causation rules that are necessitated and justified
by his formalist theory of tort-law-as-corrective-justice. For our purposes,
it is sufficient to report that Weinrib remains unpersuaded by the need to
adhere to a strict rendition of the traditional "but for" test. He chastises the
Supreme Court for its "incompletely successful efforts" in Clements and
concludes that, like the English jurisprudence, Canadian doctrine is "tied
up in knots." 24 His is a more subtle and nuanced analysis than the Supreme
Court's and one that refuses to be one-dimensional in its inquiry into and
resolution of the uncertainties of causation. Consequently, the Court's
invocation of corrective justice by way ofWeinrib to defend its continuing
attachment to the "but for" approach is unwarranted and ungrounded.
Even if tort law is built on corrective justice foundations (and I strongly
maintain that it is not and should not be), this philosophical theory neither
demands nor recommends adherence to a traditional and simplistic "but
for" test.

22. Ernest Weinrib, "Causal Uncertainty in Negligence Law" (2015) 36:1 Oxford J Legal Stud 1 at
1-2 ["Causal Uncertainty"].
23. Ernest Weinrib, The Idea ofPrivate Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
24. Weinrib, "Causal Uncertainty," supra note 22 at 1, 4. Interestingly, while the article uses
Clements, supra note 3 as an introductory hook and canvasses a range of multiple cause situations, he
does not deal with the kind of situation that arises in Clements.
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As both the common law and the Supreme Court of Canada continue
to recognize, there are several circumstances in which tort liability is
imposed without there being a necessary causal linkage established
between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's harm. In exceptional
circumstances, liability is imposed where there is no link at all. Examples
of these instances include: (1) when it is not possible to determine which
of two negligent defendants caused the plaintiff's harm, (2) when there is
strict liability or vicarious liability, and (3) when there is an intervening
act by a third party. In each of these instances, the finding of tort liability
has been upheld because there are compelling values or policies in tort law
that warrant liability and outweigh the demand for there to be a proven
"but for" connection between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's harm.
Indeed, there is not only nothing in McLachlin C.J.'s judgment that
explicitly denies this, but there is also express confirmation that the
imposition of liability without there being a necessary causal linkage
between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's harm can still be very much
part of the law. For instance, despite her efforts to justify Cook v. Lewis 25
in terms of the "but for" test, the fact is that McLachlin C.J. is willing to
impose liability on a defendant who, as in that case, did not have a proven
causal connection, necessary or non-necessary, to the plaintiff's harm.
Further, she confirms that a defendant can be found liable where there is a
definite and proven lack of causal connection; only one of the defendants,
not both, could have fired the gun that harmed the plaintiff. Her rationale
for so doing justifies a much broader scope of tort liability where the
defendant has a non-necessary connection to the plaintiff's harm:
Compensation for injury is achieved. Fairness is satisfied; the plaintiff
has suffered a loss due to negligence, so it is fair that she turns to tort
law for compensation. Further, each defendant failed to act with the care
necessary to avoid potentially causing the plaintiff's loss, and each may
well have in fact caused the plaintiff's loss. Deterrence is also furthered;
potential tortfeasors will know that they cannot escape liability by
pointing the finger at others. 26
Where McLachlin C.J. does hold the line is when the defendant's act
is not proven to be a necessary condition of the plaintiff, but merely makes
a material contribution to the risk of harm to the plaintiff. But this makes
little sense when it is appreciated that she would be prepared to hold a
negligent defendant liable, as in Cook, even when it is known that there

25.

Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR 830, [1952] 1 DLR 1 [Cook]. The American equivalent of Cook is

Summers v Tice, 199 P(2d) 1 (Cal 1948).
26. Clements, supra note 3 at para 41.
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is no causal connection at all between that defendant's act and the
plaintiff's harm. The pressing challenge is to explain why it would
be fair or just, even on corrective justice terms, to put a negligent
defendant who did not cause harm in a worse position (i.e., being held
liable) than a negligent defendant who might have caused harm? One
of the Cook defendants was presumed to be liable even though he did
not cause harm to the plaintiff, but the Clements defendant who might
well have caused or contributed to the plaintiff's harm might not be

liable.
It is the burden of the rest of this essay to explain and justify an
approach to causation that links and integrates the debate about the goals
and principles to be served by tort law and the nature of a causation
requirement. This ambition is not opposed to McLachlin C.J.'s stance,
but actually builds on its implicit and animating intention. Of course,
the debate about the goals and principles to be served by tort law is
the very stuff of heated controversy. Chief Justice McLachlin's view
carries weight and might well convince some either by way of authority
or persuasion, but it is not the final word. Not surprisingly, I will offer a
different account of tort law's values and purposes. Corrective justice
is part of the story, but only one part of it
IV. After the fact
The House of Lords that has offered amuch more progressive, pragmatic
and realistic account of causation than the Supreme Court of Canada.
In KuwaitAirways, both Lords Nicholls and Hoffmann recognised that
the appropriate test for causation is intimately connected to the policy
reasons for imposing any tort liability on the defendant. Lord Nicholls
observed that, because "the court may treat wrongful conduct as having
sufficient causal connection with the loss for the purpose of attracting
responsibility even though the simple 'but for' test is not satisfied, the
court is primarily making a value judgment on responsibility." 2 7 Lord
Hoffmann was even more expansive. Although he was clear that there
must be some causal connection between the defendant's act and the
plaintiff's harm, the nature and demonstration of that connection can
vary widely depending on the circumstances. Sometimes, a necessary
link is required; at other times, it may be enough to show that there is a
non-necessary connection that simply added to the probability that the
plaintiff would be harmed:

27. KuwaitAirways v IraqiAirways, [2002] UKHL 19 at para 74 (Lord Nicholls). It should be
noted that this was a conversion case, not a negligence one.
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There is therefore no uniform causal requirement for liability in tort.
Instead, there are varying causal requirements, depending upon the basis
and purpose of liability. One cannot separate questions of liability from
questions of causation. They are inextricably connected. One is never
simply liable; one is always liable for something and the rules which
determine what one is liable for are as much part of the substantive law
as the rules which determine which acts give rise to liability. 28
These views were repeated by Lord Hoffmann in Gregg v. Scott.29
There, he talked about the need for a "sufficient" causal link between
the defendant's act and the claimant's harm. Indeed, he confirmed that
causation is "no longer a question of all or nothing, but one of sufficiency."30
This approach was confirmed by the most recent decision of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. Drawing on precedents as far back as
1956,31 the Committee placed material contribution at the heart of its
approach to the role of causation in the imposition of tort liability.
In Williams,3 2 the plaintiff went to hospital with acute appendicitis. He
was operated on later that day, but suffered severe complications. Due to
the negligence of the hospital staff, the operation had been considerably
delayed. The issue was whether the complications were caused by the
delay or whether it was a result of his existing condition on his arrival
at the hospital. In short, did the negligence cause his complications or
not? Relying on a traditional "but for" test, the trial judge found that the
negligent delay had not caused the complications. On appeal, a more
expansive approach was adopted and the plaintiff succeeded in his claim
against the hospital. Before the Judicial Committee ofthe Privy Council, the
appeal by the hospital was dismissed and the plaintiff's claim vindicated.
The central legal question in issue was the proper test for establishing
causation in such circumstances. The Committee held that, as a matter of
law and policy, the "material contribution" approach applied. The hospital
was, therefore, liable even if there was no definitive explanation of what
actually caused the plaintiff's complications: the conclusion was that there
was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the defendant's delay
either might have caused or contributed to the plaintiff's harm.
In contrast to Clements, it was enough in Williams to meet the
causation requirement to show that the defendant's negligent act might
have contributed to the plaintiff's' harm; no necessary connection was

28.
29.
30.
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Gregg v Scott, [2015] UKHL 2.
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required. It could be clearly asserted that the defendant's negligent act
did not help the situation and that it passed a threshold of being a possible
cause. Indeed, there was strong evidence that the defendant's negligent
act might well have worsened the plaintiff's condition, even if it did not
cause it in any original or necessary sense. So, on the facts of Clements, a
similar approach would point towards the imposition of tort liability as the
defendant's negligent acts might have made a contribution to the accident,
increased the likelihood of an accident or led to more serious harm to the
plaintiff. If the defendant had not been speeding on his over-loaded bike,
he might have been better able to deal with the effects of the burst tire and
avoid the accident or moderate its consequences.
However, for my purposes, the main force of both KuwaitAirways and
Williams is twofold. First, the English courts categorically reject the idea
that a "but for" test is the only or exclusive test for determining causation
in tort cases; causation is about sufficiency and contribution as much as
necessity. The traditional "but for" test has a role to play, but it is part of a
broader and more encompassing set of rules and principles. Secondly, the
rationale for that more expansive approach is the commitment to developing
a causation test that best fits the goals and principles that comprise and
underwrite the whole scheme of tort law generally. The need to establish
a causation test does not stand aside from the other requirements for tort
liability (i.e., duty of care, standard of care, remoteness, etc.); it is not
a purely factual inquiry that is divorced from more normative concerns.
Instead, causation is to be integrated into the overall framework for
justifying the imposition of tort liability on negligent defendants in favour
of injured plaintiffs. It is to that task of proposing a better approach that I
now turn.
V. Risk and relief
It has been often and well stated that tort law is "a battleground of social
theory."3 3 Precedents, politics, personalities, philosophy, production
patterns, and much more vie for dominance in more or less conspicuous
ways. Like most theoretical debates and unlike many of its participants'
assertions, there is no external or objective vantage from which to enter or
contribute to the tort debate. Consequently, I offer an account of tort law's
policies and values that is intended to be defensible both in terms of social
justice and in terms of existing case law. As such, my account makes no
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extravagant claims about its analytical truth or philosophical authority; it is
simply put forward as a principled intervention in an unfolding ideological
engagement.34
Today's industrial and technological world is complex and
interdependent. While this has led to an improved standard of living for
many, the capacity to wreak havoc has also increased in both scale and
gravity. It is a world of considerable risk and harm. As well as direct
threats to people's health and welfare, there is a whole host of risks that
work separately, cumulatively, and in tandem to produce a hazardous and
often toxic environment. Tort law is one of the ways that society confronts
and responds to those risks and their consequences.
The annual burden that injury places on Canadians, the health care
system, and society generally, is immense. In 2004, there were 13,677
deaths, over 211,000 Canadians were hospitalized, three million emergency
room visits made, over 67,000 Canadians left permanently disabled, $10.7
billion lost in health care costs, and $19.8 billion wasted in total economic
costs. As regards non-intentional injuries (i.e., not including suicide),
transport incidents were the leading cause of injury and deaths at 34 per
cent.3 5 Many of these victims received no or meagre compensation. While
the existence of insurance moderates the situation somewhat, over 50 per
cent of the relatively small amount of compensation paid out is invested in
administering and financing its recovery, mainly to lawyers.
The common law has opted to treat the regulation of risk and the
compensation of injury as flip-sides of the same troublesome coin. This
is amply evidenced in Clements where McLachlin C.J. emphasizes the
bilateral and integrated nature ofthese two factors-"the basis for recovery,
sometimes referred to as 'corrective justice', assigns liability when the
plaintiff and defendant are linked in a correlative relationship of doer and
sufferer of the same harm."3 6 Consequently, tort law is considered to be a
prime vehicle to achieve this vision of corrective justice. Plaintiffs must
pinpoint the particular and discrete sources of risk that gave rise to their
harm or else they will be ineligible for compensation. Yet this narrow and

34. For an extended defence of this position, see Hutchinson, The Province of Jurisprudence
Democratised, supra note 33 at 10-15. Too much contemporary writing on causation in tort law is
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2015).
35.
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blinkered view of tort law is dictated neither by legal theory nor legal
doctrine. Tort is and can be a much more expansive and progressive regime
than that posited by corrective justice. Indeed, the history of tort law and
its theoretical underpinnings recommend that distributional values and
policy commitments are as important as corrective ones.
Little in tort doctrine or tort theory demands that the regulation of risk
and the compensation ofharm be seen as giving rise to amutually-reinforcing
set of questions and, in particular, to a series of all-encompassing answers.
How and whether the two enquiries are connected is tied to why they are
to be connected in the first place. While there may be some inevitable
overlap, it is surely the case that the regulation/deterrence issue gives rise
to a different range of considerations from the compensation issue. To
ask two different questions and to expect that the same answer will be
appropriate to each is a serious error. There will be obvious instances in
which society will wish to deter conduct that creates unacceptable risk,
even if it is not entirely clear that it results in actual injury. Similarly, there
will be obvious circumstances in which society will wish injured persons
to receive compensation, even if the precise source of risk is unclear or
unknown. To use the same and single blunt instrument to affect both a
process of fair compensation and a scheme of appropriate regulation is to
portend error and misjudgment.3 7
VI. Taking policy seriously
There are numerous factors that influence the fairness of any tort doctrine
that cannot be comprehended or appreciated by the abstraction and
formality of the type of corrective justice championed by McLachlin
C.J. and her concurring colleagues on the Supreme Court of Canada.
For instance, the identity of the different actors in the legal drama has
a significant and undeniable effect on their relative responsibilities and
duties. The fact that the plaintiff is most often an ailing individual and the
defendant is often a large and commercial entity or that large insurance
companies stand behind much litigation are factors that can only be ignored
or marginalized at the inevitable cost of fundamentally misrepresenting
the worlds of accidents and harms.38 While these matters ought not to drive
37. Of course, it might well be that the best response to this dilemma is to reject tort law entirely.
However, this essay proceeds on the basis that tort law is here to stay. Therefore, the challenge is how
to develop the causation requirement in the least worst way possible.
38. A good example of that is the "social host" case of Childs v Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18, [2006] 1
SCR 643. This decision can only be fully appreciated in terms of the insurance arrangements in place.
The only reason that the injured plaintiffs sought recovery from the social host was that the insurance
limits of the primary tortfeasor, the drunken driver, had already been reached and there still remained
a large deficit in the damages recovered.
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entirely the development and structure of tort law, they ought not to be
rendered irrelevant either; a corrective justice approach does that.
By treating injured individuals as being comparable in their
circumstances, in their behaviour, and in their vulnerability as profitmaking corporations is not only neglectful, but also unjust. The formalistic
insistence of talking about tort law, negligence and causation as involving
a paradigmatic and bipolar equation between A and B defies any
reasonable or defensible sense of law as any kind of vehicle for obtaining
and advancing social justice. It is neither neutral nor objective to posit
litigants in personal injury litigation as being equivalent or faceless
characters. For corporate defendants, the cost of accidents is simply that
-an economic cost and calculation.3 9 For plaintiffs, the costs of accidents
are much more personal, physical and irremediable. The most that tort
law can do to defendants is to ask them to quantify the costs of accidents
and their prevention in monetary terms. The least that tort law can do
is to ask plaintiffs to value their injuries in monetary terms alone. This
is an ill-balanced and misleading equation of equality; corrective justice
is comparing apples and oranges, with tragic consequences not only for
injured individuals, but also for society at large.
Also, it is important to understand that the individualized focus of
the common law is ill-suited to the world of contemporary risks and
accidents. Most serious illnesses, as well as many injuries, are attributable
to a whole host of interactive conditions and circumstances. Rather than
being unique and dichotomous, the modem world of risk and accidents
is probabilistic and continuous. Agent Orange, Bhopal, DES, Chernobyl,
the Dalkon Shield, and tainted blood supplies created situations in which
the traditional "but for" causation test is hopelessly inadequate. The
unfathomable interaction of different causes prevents the isolation of
particular causes for particular injuries: the best that can be achieved is
a general correlation of acts and consequences in terms of their statistical
aggregation and impact. The attribution of responsibility is simply a
conclusion based on a rebuttable hypothesis of a probabilistic generality.
Against such an understanding, it is grossly unfair to plaintiffs to persevere
with the customary individualized rules and procedures for recovery. Many

39. This is the basic message of the Learned Hand test. See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159
F (2d) 169 (2nd Cir 1947). It is worth noting that law-and-economic scholars are willing to dispense
with or downgrade the need for a strict causation test. See for example, William M Landes & Richard
A Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) at 229.
Guido Calabresi, "Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr" (1975) 43
U Chicago L Rev 69. However, an approach that concentrates on the least cost-avoider does not so
much do away with the causation requirement as submerge or hide it within that inquiry.
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plaintiffs, as opposed to defendants, are in no position, either evidentially
or financially, to overcome the uncertainty and indeterminacy of causal
evaluations that lie at the core of modem accidents; they are victimized
again by the tort system. As such, a continuing attachment to traditional
tort doctrine, especially in regard to causation, is inimical to social justice
in the contemporary world of risks and harms. The narrow and abstract
focus of a corrective justice approach exacerbates the situation.
Instead of a corrective approach, tort law and theory is much more
multi-faceted, multi-valenced and multi-layered. Like much else in law,
the structure and development of tort doctrine is a classic example of
the common law's tendency for "muddling through."" There is no one
simplistic thread that ties it all together; it a normative quilt of many
different strands and themes. At different times and in different ways, it has
prioritized a range of disparate values and competing policy commitments
-moral responsibility, economic efficiency, risk prevention, distributive
justice, entrepreneurial innovation, just desserts, fair compensation, and
more. The history of tort law shows that each of these values and aims
has played some role, to a lesser or greater extent, in the formulation of
basic doctrine and its details. The assertion that there is some consistent
or unifocal approach is simply unconvincing; most theories, including a
corrective justice approach, can claim some plausible degree of fit and
justification in the voluminous jurisprudence of tort law." But no one
theory can assert intellectual or normative hegemony.
Against this backdrop, a central question to be decided is how to
balance the worlds of risk and harm. In particular, it has to be asked in
what circumstances should the creator of risks be required to compensate
for any harms that might be attributable to those risks. This is where the
causation inquiry becomes particularly acute. The compulsion to treat
causation as a factual matter runs afoul of the mandate to treat causation
as something that is to be determined as part of the overall policy basis
for tort liability. However, understood in a more pragmatic way, the most
appropriate question to be answered is not what was the cause of the
plaintiff's harm. Nor is it whether the defendant's act was the cause of
the plaintiff's harm. And nor is it even whether the negligent defendant's
act was the cause of the plaintiff's harm. The pressing question for tort
liability is: Was the existence of the defendant's negligent act a sufficient

40. See Allan C Hutchinson, Evolution and the Common Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 235-270.
41. One of the best surveys remains Izhak Englard, "The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of
Modem American Tort Theory" (1980) 9:1 J Leg Stud 27.
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reason in terms of realizing tort law broad range ofpolicies to warrant
imposing liability on the defendantfor the plaintiff's harm?42
This is not an isolated inquiry that stands apart from the other details
of the case or context. It looks to all the facts of the accident and reaches
a conclusion based on how the various policy values of the law can best
be served or advanced. Of course, differences of opinion about tort law's
aims and commitments will manifest themselves in differences about how
that inquiry can be considered and resolved. Of course, it seems entirely
sensible to insist that, without some connection between the defendant's
act and the plaintiff's injury, there should be no liability placed upon a
defendant. This would apply no matter how negligent the defendant may
have been or how injured the plaintiff might be. However, this does not
explain what the nature of that connection is or how it can be proven to
the court's satisfaction. What does explain how that is to be characterized
and demonstrated is the policy approach taken to the imposition of tort law
generally. So an attachment to corrective justice will offer a narrow test of
causation, whereas a commitment to a broader and more pluralistic range
of policy ambitions will recommend a more expansive and less pinched
account of causation.4 3 It is to such a policy-based approach to causation
that I now finally turn.
VII. Shifting over
The instances in which it is possible to prove clearly that the defendant's
negligent act did or did not offer a sufficient reason for imposing liability
to the plaintiff on the defendant are not the stuff of controversy. They
can be easily and commonly dealt with by most approaches, even if there
are marginal disagreements over the size and character of these matters.
However, the challenge of any test is to offer assistance and guidance
when the facts or circumstances are difficult or unclear. This is exactly
the situation in cases like Clements and Williams. As I have contended,
the traditional "but for" test is of no practical value in such situations as
it either over- or under-determines what possible causes are included or
excluded. More significantly, when it is understood as a rule of exclusion
as well as inclusion as it is in Clements and Williams, the "but for" test cuts
in very stark and partial lines; it will exclude most cases that fall into the
42. My approach is not new. See Walter Blum & Harry Kalven Jr, Public Perspectiveson a Private
Law Problem: Auto Compensation Plans (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985) at 8-12. The seminal piece
on the insoluble relation between fact and policy in tort causation is Wex Malone, "Ruminations on
Cause-in-Fact" (1956) 9:1 StanL Rev 60. Of course, the corollary of this approach is the abandonment
of tort law entirely.
43. That difference in approachto causation is what lies at the heart of the contrast between Canadian
and English jurisprudence. See supra, text at notes 27-31.
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largest group of litigated cases, the not-sure category. Under a traditional
"but for" rule, the plaintiff has the burden risk of non-persuasion, so a lack
of knowledge about the operation or sequencing of the particular facts will
count disproportionately against plaintiffs. It will be defendants who are
the fortunate beneficiaries of this institutional and normative asymmetry.
The culprits are many in this doctrinal villainy. But a maj or one remains
Holmes's enduring pronouncement that "the general principle of our law
is that loss from accidents must lie where it falls." 4 Of course, modem
tort law comprises a set of rules and exceptions that explain and justify
an "unless" condition. So, for example, the plaintiff must demonstrate, if
losses are not to lie where they fall and are to shift from the plaintiff to the
defendant, that there is some fault on behalf of the defendant that warrants
the imposition of liability on the defendant. This is where causation, among
other things, comes into play. Even if the defendant is considered to have
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and to have breached that duty by acting
negligently, the defendant will not be liable unless the defendant is found
to have caused the plaintiffs injuries. Holmes's principle puts the onus on
the plaintiff to prove such a causal connection. If the plaintiff cannot do
this, the claim will fail. This means that in circumstances where it is not
known what caused the plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff will lose. This may
seem entirely fair until it is appreciated that this range of unknowns is vast.
Yet, in some situations, some courts have not allowed the "but for"
test's structural unfairness to prevail. Indeed, even McLachlin CT. and
the Supreme Court of Canada conceded this. Cook is the prime exhibit;
two negligent defendants were considered to be capable of both being
liable to compensate the plaintiff even though only one of the defendants'
acts caused the plaintiff's harm; two hunters fired, but only one hit the
plaintiff.5 But this concession intimates that tort law is dedicated to
achieving a pluralistic range of normative ambitions in organizing tort
doctrine. The question is less whether the "but for" test should be set aside,
but how and when it is to be set aside. To put it bluntly, in what situation
should the "but for" test be set aside so as to ensure that unfairness is
not perpetuated by the rules for imposing liability on defendants and for
providing compensation to plaintiffs?
My response to that is clear. It is based on two primary points of relative
capability. The first is that defendants are often (but not always, of course)
in a better position than plaintiffs to overcome that uncertainty; the lack

44. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009)
at 87.
45.

See Cook, supra note 25.

Out of the Black Hole: Toward a Fresh Approach
to Tort Causation

581

of knowledge about the effects of certain products, actions or processes is
more directly and appropriately resolvable by those who engage in them
and profit from them. The second is that defendants, as a group, are often
(but not always, of course) in a better position through resources and/or
insurance to absorb and re-distribute the amount of compensation paid to
plaintiffs. In contrast, plaintiffs are less able to re-distribute their losses.
Their injuries remain the same, no matter what the extent of the plaintiffs'
compensation or even their own insurance; monetary compensation
does not alter, even if it cushions the physical effects of their injuries.
Accordingly, there needs to be a re-calibration of the adverse effects of
unknown" situations so that their burden is more evenly shared among
plaintiffs and defendants. As one Canadian judge squarely put it, "if
causation is overwhelmingly difficult to prove or impossible to prove then
it is a matter of public policy or justice that it is the creator of the risk
who should be put to the trouble of hurdling the difficulty or bearing the
consequences." 4 6
In line with this policy, a McGhee4 -based initiative recommends
itself as an equitable and policy-based response. The answer to the central
question-was the existence of the defendant's negligent act a sufficient
reason in terms of realizing tort law's broad range of policies to warrant
imposing liability on the defendant for the plaintiff's harm?-can be
divided into two parts:
* First, plaintiffs have to prove that they have suffered harm and that
their hann is consistent with the kind of hann that the defendants'
negligent act might bring about; this can be done by showing that the
defendants' negligent act was involved in or might have contributed
to the accident that resulted in the plaintiffs' hann; and
* Secondly, on the proof of such matters, the onus will shift to
defendants to demonstrate that their negligent act was not involved
in or contributed to the plaintiffs' injuries. Unless the defendants can
show this, they will be held liable.
In particular, this approach builds on the acceptance by many judges
that they are "not engaged in ascertaining ultimate verities" or anything
like it.4 1 Instead, they are in the business of administering justice. In
unresolvable circumstances of causal uncertainty, it is surely fairer that

46. Nowsco Well Service Ltd v Canadian Propane Gas and Oil Ltd (1981), 122 DLR (3d) 228
7 Sask R 291 at para 60 per Bayda JA. See also Letnik v Municipality ofMetropolitan Toronto
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47. Supra note 5. Even Weinrib countenances this possibility. See supra, text at notes 22-24.
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a negligent actor should carry the weight of non-persuasion as against a
relatively blameless and injured person. Provided that the plaintiff leads
some prima facie evidence about the creation of risk, the existence of a
duty of care to the plaintiff, and the occurrence of a possible harm to the
plaintiff, plaintiffs should be entitled to recover and defendants should not
be permitted to escape liability through lack of any definitive finding of
causation. Any other rule would mean that plaintiffs would always lose
whenever there was doubt, as there inevitably will be, about the "but for"
link between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury. Moreover, my
proposal would redress the equitable balance; plaintiffs would occasionally,
but by no means always, win and defendants would occasionally, but by
no means always, lose. How the test is applied in detail will, of course,
represent the policy preferences of the judge and the circumstances.
This proposal builds on rather than rejects McLachlin C.J.'s view in
Clements that a material contribution test "is a policy-driven rule of law
designed to permit plaintiffs to recover in such cases despite their failure
to prove causation." 4 9 It is simply wrong to assert, as she does, that it
"does not signify a test of causation at all.""o It is very much a test of
causation; it is simply not a supposedly or exclusively factual one. Instead,
it more directly incorporates and addresses the values and commitments to
fairness that actually drive and animate the Supreme Court's reliance on a
"but for" rule that is supposedly factual in nature and application. Also, if
the judgment in Clements is to be taken seriously, my approach advances
those policy reasons that warrant the Chief Justice's reasons for allowing
for an exception to the "but for" test in the case of multiple tortfeasors.
Her mistake is not in relying on such values, but on unduly confining them
only to the context of multiple tortfeasors:
Compensation for injury is achieved. Fairness is satisfied; the plaintiff
has suffered a loss due to negligence, so it is fair that she turns to tort
law for compensation. Further, [the] defendant failed to act with the
care necessary to avoid potentially causing the plaintiff's loss, and may
well have in fact caused the plaintiff's loss. Deterrence is also furthered;
potential tortfeasors will know that they cannot escape liability by pointing
the finger at others."
In Clements, a shift in focus and emphasis away from the "but for" rule
would reap considerable dividends and come closer to effecting real and
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substantive justice. On the facts, it was simply unknowable whether the
defendant's negligence or the nail was the exclusive "but for" source of the
plaintiff's injuries. Instead, under my proposal, the plaintiff would need to
show that the defendant's negligence (i.e., driving an overloaded bike too
fast) could well have resulted in the kind of injuries that she suffered. It
would then be on the negligent defendant to lead convincing evidence to
the court that such a supposition was unlikely. Driving an overloaded bike
too fast is an act that needs to be discouraged; it was an accident that, at a
minimum, was waiting to happen. As between the negligent defendant and
the blameless plaintiff, therefore, the benefit of the doubt (i.e., placing the
risk of non-persuasion on the defendant) should go to the plaintiff Justice
is surely better served by such an outcome.
Similarly in Williams much the same analysis can be followed. On
the facts, it was unknowable whether the cause of the plaintiff's injuries
was the defendant's negligence or some other pre-existing cause. To
pretend that an extended "but for" approach can resolve matters is merely
wishful thinking. Again, therefore, it seems entirely reasonable in such
circumstances to put the weight of non-persuasion on the negligent
defendant as opposed to the blameless plaintiff. Once the plaintiff has
shown that his injuries are consistent with the type of negligent act done by
the defendants, then the defendant can offer evidence to demonstrate that
this is not the case. In the event of not being able to do so, the defendants
will be liable. Moreover, this will provide an incentive to defendants, like
the hospital and the medical establishment generally, to avoid future delays
and/or to develop means by which to identify the causative pathways of
different medical harms. Also, this is surely a fairer and more acceptable
outcome than simply letting the defendants walk away from the possible
effects of their negligence.
Some might contend that my proposal obliges the common law to
implode by making it into a thoroughly open-ended policy debate between
judges. However, this assumes that the common law is not already such
a process when it is. Despite claims to preserve the "but for" test as a
factual algorithm, the present doctrine is a convenient screen that hides,
not obviates, the need for engagement over the best policies to follow
and operationalize. 5 2 My proposal brings that debate out into the open by
putting the decisive policy-choices of judges at centre-stage. As such, the
contribution of my proposal is not to introduce policy into the common law
doctrine of causation, but to come clean on the idea that the common law,
52.

Allan C Hutchinson, Towards an Informal Account of Legal Interpretation (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2016), chapter 9.

584

The Dalhousie Law Journal

even in its most doctrinal and technical moments, is a policy-driven and
value-laden practice. As things stand, the common law does not finesse
policy conflicts, but only hides them.
Conclusion
While it is foolhardy (and unnecessary) to suggest that my proposal offers
"a benevolent principle [which] smiles on... factual uncertainties and
melts them all away,"53 it does make practical progress and offers policy
continuity. It seeks to ensure that the effect of there being a large range of
circumstances in which the demonstrable cause of the plaintiff's harm is
unknown or unknowable does not fall disproportionately on plaintiffs. The
resort to the negligent acts of the defendant as a tie-breaker both makes
more doctrinal sense and leads to less substantive injustice. If the search
for a test of factual causation is as doomed as I have suggested, then the
only way to avoid the fate of most scholars and judges who persist in that
search is to abandon it entirely. A more satisfying and resolvable pursuit is
to incorporate causation fully and fairly into the overall policy framework
and rationale of tort law generally. Churchill might well have approved of
that, before or after dinner.
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